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The Secretary of State for International
Development hosted a seminar on 15 July 1998 to
discuss the East Asia crisis and the implications for
the Department for International Development's
(DFID) policies to reduce poverty Many of the par-
ticipants had spent the previous two days in dis-
cussion at the Institute of Development Studies.
This note is a general summary of the discussion. It
should not be taken to imply agreement to all
points by every participant, or a UK Government
statement or DFID policy A fuller record of the dis-
cussion, a list of participants and papers prepared
for the seminars will be made available on the
DFID Intranet site.
The Genesis and Depth of the
Crisis
The opening session discussed the genesis of the
crisis and the depth of the recession. Several coun-
tries were now facing significant output falls, and
there were increasing concerns that the recession
would be 'U' or even 'L shaped, rather than 'V'
shaped as many analysts had initially predicted.
The crisis was more severe than the Latin American
crisis of the 1980s and threatened a lost decade of
development in the region.
The increasing pessimism reflected a growing
realisation of the depth of the problem in affected
countries. In addition the effects were spreading to
neighbouring countries, e.g. Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia, and even having knock-on effects out-
side the region, e.g. Russia and South Africa.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes
had so far failed to restore confidence. There was a
risk of further rounds of crisis if demand in the
region could not be stimulated. Economic policy in
China and Japan was critical to the evolution of the
crisis.
There was broad agreement about the factors that
had contributed to the crisis, although different
commentators attached varying importance to the
relative role played by each:
A rapid build up in private sector capital
inflows; notably short term borrowing in for-
eign exchange. The inflows had reflected the
belief by investors that the region would con-
tinue to grow strongly, that exchange rates
would remain fixed and that there were implicit
government guarantees to the banking sector.
Massive Japanese investment (reflecting high
Japanese saving rates) which resulted in over-
capacity in some industrial sectors, e.g. cars and
computer chips.
The emergence of China as a major world trader.
Poorly regulated financial systems and strong
links between banks and their customers - so
called 'crony capitalism' - which had allowed
these inflows to be channelled increasingly into
unproductive investment.
The maintenance of fixed exchange rates
(pegged to the dollar) which had resulted in a
slow but steady appreciation of the real effective
exchange rate between 1994 and 1997.
The increasing supply of highly liquid global
capital flows which were vulnerable to rapid
reversals in investor sentiment.
The exacerbation of the financial pressures by a
lack of confidence in the ability of the political
system to act effectively, e.g. Indonesia.
Inappropriately tight fiscal policies in some early
IMF programmes, which may have exacerbated
the problem (see below).
The Impact on the Poor
The crisis represented a setback to the impressive
record of poverty reduction over the last 20 years.
Asia's dramatic success in reducing absolute poverty
levels had resulted largely from strong growth,
rather than redistribution. Social security and
unemployment insurance systems had not been put
in place.
As economic activity has contracted, increasing
unemployment and reduced trading opportunities
have removed existing livelihoods. Traditional
safety net systems have often disappeared and there
were no modern welfare systems in place. This
meant that the poor, and the newly unemployed,
were extremely vulnerable. They were being
squeezed by falling incomes and rising prices (ici
some regions, the cost of basic foodstuffs had
increased by 30-50 per cent). In Indonesia the per-
centage of the population living below the poverty
line had risen from 13 per cent to 25 per cent, and
the figure was rising.
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Although the effects of the crisis were greatest in the
urban areas, the extended family system transmit-
ted the effects widely Remittance incomes have
dried up and urban dwellers have tried to re-estab-
lish themselves in rural areas. The social services
came under increasing pressure as the impact of
real budget cuts were felt. People were abandoning
private systems, which had become unaffordable,
placing greater pressure on the already stressed
public systems.
Women and children were bearing the brunt of the
crisis. School drop-out rates were rising as parents
were unable to afford school fees. Children were
increasingly forced to work in the informal sector.
People were resorting to coping mechanisms,
including illegal activities and prostitution. Signs of
social distress, including violence and suicide, were
on the increase.
Rapid action was needed if the impressive gains of
the last two decades were not to be reversed. At the
macroeconomic level, restoring confidence and
facilitating an early return to growth was the key to
reversing the recent rise in poverty But the financial
crisis and the social crisis needed to be resolved
together. Poverty alleviation needed to be at the cen-
tre of adjustment and reform programmes. There was
a danger that social unrest could undermine the
political process necessary to undertake reform.
More immediately, the lack of government systems
and NGO networks was severely impairing the abil-
ity of the international community to respond to
the emerging crisis. Some participants argued for
comprehensive social protection systems to be put
in place; but the affordability of such systems at a
time when tax revenues were falling was recognised
as a problem. Urgent work was required to deter-
mine how best to target those most in need.
The Way Forward
It was suggested that progress on several fronts was
required to prevent the crisis deepening and stim-
ulate the region's return to growth. The main points
were:
Reflation of the Japanese economy Without
additional demand within the region, recovery
would be slow.
Fiscally stimulated domestic demand within the
crisis economies. Several commentators argued
that the IMF's insistence on fiscal stringency in
the first round of rescue packages had exacer-
bated recessionary forces. They were encouraged
that the IMF was now adopting an expansionary
approach (notably in Indonesia) with expendi-
ture targeted on meeting the basic needs of those
most affected by the crisis. But the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bilateral donors
would need to provide substantial financial sup-
port to ensure that domestic governments did
not finance the deficit by printing money
Maintenance of the value of the Chinese cur-
rency Devaluation by China could result in a
round of competitive devaluation by others; this
would further increase the debt burden of the
crisis countries (without commensurate gains to
competitiveness).
A rapid resolution of private sector debts.
Domestically, effective bankruptcy laws should
be put in place and implemented quickly It
must also be recognised that asset values had
been sharply reduced. On the international
front, this meant maximising the pressure for
overseas creditors (e.g. overseas banks) to reach
agreement with domestic debtors to find a way
forward in cases where there were outstanding
debts that the debtor could no longer finance.
Early restructuring and recapitalisation of the
banking and financial sector. Without this, the
crisis economies would face limited access to
international capital markets. The crisis
economies were currently facing a damaging
credit crunch. Experience from other regions
highlighted the need for quick and decisive
action. In practice this might necessitate a pub-
lic sector take-over of banks. The cost of recap-
italisation was likely to range from 20 to 30 per
cent of GDP in different countries. Low levels of
existing public debt as a percentage of GDP
meant that governments should be able to
absorb these costs (though they were
substantial).
Support for export recovery. High external debt-
financing obligations underlay the need to run
current account surpluses. But if the region was
to recover quickly, these surpluses must be
based on export growth rather than import com-
pression. Thus far, the strengthening of current
accounts had predominantly reflected the latter.
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Regional demand should therefore be stimulated
to boost intra-regional trade and access to
Western markets should be maintained. There
should be no protectionist backlash against
Asian exports.
Affordable social protection systems should be
put in place; these were essential to maintain
popular support and ensure the economic crisis
did not degenerate into a political one.
Lessons for Other Developing
Countries
There was widespread agreement that the 'Asian
growth' model had brought enormous benefits to
the region. It was largely responsible for the dra-
matic reductions in world poverty over the last
10-20 years. But this period of sustained economic
growth should have been used to put basic social
security systems in place.
The importance to sustained development of a
prudent and solvent banking system was widely
recognised. It was illusory to consider that the core
banking system could be divorced from the public
sector; moral hazard existed, and reinforced the
need for effective regulation and treatment of the
debt of the banking sector as a contingent liability
of the state. Data on the extent of indebtedness, par-
ticularly private sector debt, was often inadequate.
It was also acknowledged that capital controls could
insulate developing economies from disruptive and
highly volatile short-term capital flows. Those
developing countries that had already liberalised
their capital account were most vulnerable. Those
who had not - such as India - were cautious about
the benefits.
The response to the crisis had sent perverse signals
to investors. Short-term lenders had been largely
protected, while longer-term lenders and equity
investors had been penalised. There was need for
research into the benefits of short-term capital and
measures to encourage longer-term capital flows.
Reference was made to the Chilean system of
deposit requirements to deter short-term flows and
the need for a typology of appropriate measures.
There was agreement that while developing
countries should aspire to full liberalisation, the key
was to get the sequencing and speed right. In
practice this meant ensuring the banking and
financial sectors were sound and well regulated
before liberalising short-term capital flows. It was
also important to distinguish good regulatory prac-
tice (and hence sensible prudential requirements)
from capital controls.
There were also lessons for fiscal and monetary
policy; both could be used to ameliorate the effect
of short-run capital inflows. Moving to a more flex-
ible exchange rate regime, or introducing wide
bands around a central parity, could help reduce
speculative inflows and tighter fiscal policy could
help offset the inflationary impact.
Some commentators suggested there might be a
need to limit current account deficits to no more
than 2-3 per cent of GDP, and to build up sizeable
foreign exchange reserves. While there was broad
agreement that current account deficits must be
kept at sustainable levels, there was some doubt as
to whether large foreign exchange reserves were
much help once markets perceived an exchange
rate to be significantly over-valued. The key to
exchange rate stability was coherent and transpar-
ent macroeconomic policies.
Lessons for the Global Community
and the Bretton Woods Institutions
Although it was vital to learn from the crisis and try
to prevent similar occurrences elsewhere in the
world, it was also necessary to recognise that crises
will occur - and necessary for the international
community to learn how to respond to them. It was
felt that few lessons had been learnt from the Latin
American and Mexican crises.
The international response to the Asia crisis was in
danger of creating moral hazard'. By bailing out'
crisis economies the IFIs had, in effect, protected
the private sector from bearing the full cost of their
lending/investment decisions. lt was especially
incongruous that those operating at the short end of
the market were likely to bear the least cost. This
gave the private sector little incentive to assess risk
properly While it would always be necessary to
respond swiftly to a crisis, the international
17
community must find ways of ensuring that the
private sector bares the responsibility for poor
lending decisions.
One possibility was for the IMF to consider 'lending
into arrears' ï.e. continuing to lend to countries that
are in arrears (including where debt standstills have
arisen), provided appropriate adjustment policies
are in place. A further possibility was to involve the
private sector in crisis resolution, for example, by
encouraging countries to establish 'lines of credit'
with international banks for emergency use only
Argentina had recently moved in this direction,
though the facility had not (yet) been tested. It was
suggested that there might be an important role for
the IMF to play in organising international debt
write down and/or rescheduling, including where
the private sector was involved.
Some participants questioned the role of the IMF in
the late twentieth century as private capital flows
became increasingly dominant and complex. It was
clear it did not have the financial resources to act as
a true 'lender of last resort'. Its present modus
operandi, with tranches of funds available on an
increasingly conditional basis, provided an incen-
tive for investors to withdraw funds (the rush for
the exit) rather than for staying in. Equally, it was
recognised that there were difficulties over the role
of the World Bank in large-scale financial crises.
Looking to the future it would be essential to:
Enhance the links between the various JHs -
including the IMF, World Bank, Bank of
International Settlements (BIS) and the Regional
Multilateral Banks - to make maximum use of
their areas of relative expertise.
Strengthen surveillance, especially as regards
financial institutions, capital flows and short
term debt exposure (of both the public and pri-
vate sectors). The IFIs needed to strengthen their
institutional capacity in these areas. National
governments should be encouraged to provide
timely and accurate data.
Encourage the early adoption of the highest
standards of financial supervision as regards
both prudential requirements and effective
regulation.
The Implications for the
Government's Development
Strategy
Participants were invited to draw out implications
for the government's development strategy:
The crisis had potential implications for the
International Development Targets. They
appeared more difficult to attain than they did
12 months ago. With reduced growth prospects
in Asia, equity issues would become critical.
The immediate focus on macroeconomic solu-
tions to the financial problems should not
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obscure the need to ensure that policies
adequately addressed the consequences for poor
people.
The immediate focus on Asia should not obscure
the possibility of similar problems emerging
elsewhere, perhaps particularly in the transition
economies.
The UK had comparative advantage in the
instruments available to help resolve this crisis
and prevent others. These ranged from policy
influence, as in the finance ministers' input to
the G8 Summit, to bilateral action, through the
transfer of know-how.
